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THE ELUSIVE BURDEN OF PROOF UNDER THE
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH ACT OF 1970
by
David Ford Hunt*

T

HE Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970,' which became effective on April 28, 1971, is designed by the exercise of congressional
interstate commerce powers "to assure so far as possible every working man
and woman in the nation safe and healthful working conditions." 2 Aimed at
private employers in interstate commerce, 3 OSHA requires employers to

furnish to employees a place of employment free from recognized hazards
that are causing or are liable to cause death or serious injury.4 Although

employees are also required to comply with the health and safety standards,
OSHA provides for no penalty against employees for failure to comply. As
yet not amended, OSHA operates on an annual appropriation of $150 million
per year.
OSHA grants to the executive branch, the Secretary of Labor (the Secretary), enforcement and prosecution powers, and to a newly created agency of
the executive branch, the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC),6 initial review powers if an employer petitions or appeals from
a citation or proposed penalty issued to the employer by the Secretary. 7 Thus,
OSHA vests both legislative and quasi-judicial functions in the executive

branch of government.8 The Secretary is granted the power both to issue a
citation against an employer for violation of safety and health standards or the

general duty clause, and to assess a monetary penalty. The citation and
penalty are final unless the employer, within the time limits prescribed,
contests the citation and penalty to OSHRC. 9 An employer must, therefore,
* B.S., North Texas State University; LL.B., Vanderbilt University. Attorney at Law,
Dallas, Texas.
I. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as "OSHA" or "the Act"]. The Act is
also known as the Williams-Steiger Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.
[Editor's Note: Cases coming before OSHRC are reported in one or more of the
following, reporters: Occupational, Safety' and Health Review Commission
Reporter (O.S.A.H.R.C.); BNA Occupational Safety and Health Reporter
(O.S.H.C.); CCH Occupational Safety and Health Reporter (CCH OSHD). The
official reporter is O.S.A.H.R.C. When possible, cases are cited to the official
and BNA reporters. Cases appearing in neither of these reporters are cited to the
CCH reporter.]
2. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1970).
3. Id. § 654(a)(2).
4. This requirement is known as the general duty clause. Id. § 654(a)(1).
5. Id. § 654(b).
6. Id. § 661(a). The Fifth Circuit prefers "OSHRECOM." See Atlas Roofing Co. v.
OSHRC, 518 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 1458, 47 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1976) (No.
75-746).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 659 (1970).
8. For a discussion of some problems created by this unique mixture see Industrial Union
Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 659(a) (1970).
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initiate his contest of a citation and penalty to OSHRC as prescribed by
must
OSHA, and may not appeal directly to a court. Simply, an employer
10
exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking court review.
Following a notice of contest, an employer is provided two levels of review
by OSHRC. An employer must first attend a hearing before a local hearing
examiner (judge).lI If either the employer, the employees, or the Secretary is
dissatisfied with the OSHRC judge's findings and conclusion, then that party
may request review by OSHRC. 2 The Commission, however, may refuse to
review the judge's decision. In the case of such a refusal the decision of the
judge is final and the aggrieved party's next step is to the United States court
of appeals for the circuit in which the employer is located or the violation
occurred. 13 If a review to OSHRC is granted, the Commission may affirm,
modify, reverse, or remand the decision of the hearing judge. 4 Unless
remanded to the judge for further hearing, the decision of the Commission is
final, 15 and the next step for any party is to the appropriate court of appeals.
The court of appeals is bound by the substantial evidence rule and no defense
or points on appeal are allowed unless raised before OSHRC. Further review
to the United States Supreme Court is provided, although to date only two
cases have been granted a writ by the Supreme Court, and these cases 16 are
limited to a review of the effect of the seventh amendment.
Finally, OSHA provides that the states may take over functions of the
Secretary and OSHRC, 17 although control of OSHA functions by the several
states would erode any possibility of a uniform enforcement program. Since
such a take-over has not yet occurred, this Article assumes exclusive federal
control and discusses the currently existing procedures for enforcement and
review under OSHA provisions.
I.

ORGANIZATION FOR ENFORCEMENT

A. Powers and Duties of the Secretary of Labor
Promulgationof Specific Safety Standards.The Secretary is granted powers
by the Act to create two national advisory committees composed in part of8
both management and labor representatives. A twelve-member committee
appointed by the Secretary advises the Secretary on administration of the
10. Restland Memorial Park v. Secretary of Labor, No. 75-1189 (3d Cir., July 30, 1976).
I1. 29 U.S.C. § 661(i) (1970). There are 45 OSHRC judges located in 10 offices throughout
the country, but the judges hold hearings in 75 or more different sites.
12. Id. § 661(a). The Third Circuit, however, recently held that an employer who is dissatisfied with a judge's decision must request a review by OSHRC as a prerequisite to appeal to the
courts. Until such a request for OSHRC review is made, the employer has not exhausted his
administrative remedies. Keystone Roofing Co. v. Dunlop, No. 75-2010 (3d Cir., June 8, 1976).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1970).
14. Id. § 661. The 3-member Commission is required by the Act to reach a 2-member
majority before rendering an opinion. See Shaw Constr., Inc. v. OSHRC, No. 75-3495 (5th Cir.,
July 12, 1976) (petition for rehearing filed).
15. The Review Commission may hold a further hearing with the parties, but to date has not
done so. In fact, only on rare occasions has the Commission even allowed oral argument by
counsel. Briefs are, however, required from all parties by the Commission on certified points of
review.
16. The two cases are currently under consideration by the Court. See note 47 infra and
accompanying text.
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 667, 672 (1970).
18. Id. § 656(a)(1).
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Act, and a second committee, with as many as fifteen members,' 9 advises him
on new safety standards. Specific standards adopted by the Secretary are
published in the Federal Register so that interested persons may within a
certain period of time comment on or object to a proposed standard. In the
event of objection or comment the Secretary may order a hearing prior to the
final adoption of the standard.2"
Under OSHA an employer may either contest the enactment of a standard21
or apply for a temporary 22 or permanent variance.23 In addition, the employer
may petition the United States court of appeals for judicial review of the
standard. 24 Despite their existence, none of these remedies has been widely
utilized by employers for at least two reasons: employers are generally
unaware of what the Secretary is proposing as a safety standard, and unwilling to comply with OSHA standards until a compliance officer inspects a
jobsite. An employer who does contest a citation for violation of a safety
standard will normally base his appeal upon the ground that the standard was
promulgated by the Secretary following the recommendation of an advisory
committee which did not include a representative of the trade, craft, or
industry of the employer. In such a case the employer has the burden of
showing that the lack of representation was prejudicial to his interests.25
Enforcement of Safety Standards.Safety standards, after promulgation, are
enforced by the Secretary through citation and assessment of a penalty
against an employer pursuant to either specific statutory authority 26 or the
general duty clause.2 7 The latter provision is more aptly described as the
"catch-all clause." When the Secretary is unable to fit a given situation to a
specific standard published in the Federal Register, he invokes the general
duty clause to find a violation. Both OSHRC and the courts have given the
Secretary's interpretation of specific safety standards and violations of the
general duty clause wide latitude.
Enforcement Procedures. The Secretary is empowered under OSHA to conduct an inspection of any employer's workplace in order to investigate and
determine if the employer is in violation of a specific safety standard or in
violation of the general duty clause. 28 The statute specifically provides:
In order to carry out the purposes of this chapter, the Secretary, upon
presenting appropriate credentials to the owner, operator, or agent in
charge, is authorized(1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant,
establishment, construction site, or other area, workplace or environment where work is performed by an employee of an employer; and
19. Id. §656(b). The Act provides that these safety standards may also be recommended by
NIOSH, an agency under the Secretary of HEW. Id. § 671(b).
20. Id. § 655(b).
21. Id. § 655(f).
22. Id. § 655(b)(6).
23. Id. § 655(d).
24. Id. § 655(f). Petition for judicial review must come before the standard is enacted.
25. National Roofing Contractors Ass'n v. Brennan, 495 F.2d 1294 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
26. 29 U.S.C. §§ 654, 658 (1970).
27. Id. § 654(a)(1).
28. Id. § 657(a).
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(2) to inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at
other reasonable times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable
manner, any such place ot employment and all pertinent conditions,
structures, machines, apparatus, devices, equipment, and materials
therein, and to question privately any such employer, owner, operator,
agent or employee.2 9
For some time the Secretary's right to enter a work area was unchallenged. In
1976, however, an employer successfully persuaded a federal district court
that the statutory right of the Secretary to enter an employer's workplace was
not absolute. The court held that the Secretary, when challenged by an
employer, must secure from the nearest United States district court a search
warrant based upon probable cause that a safety violation exists at the
employment site. 30 In deciding the case, however, the court considered four
limitations: (a) The employer must initially object to the inspection; (b) the
Secretary may be barred by the employer only from "non-public portions" of
the worksite; (c) an emergency must not exist at the worksite nor the inspection be conducted following a complaint; (d) the employer must not be a
licensed business, e.g., a liquor or gun business. 3' The court's holding was
apparently a response to the Secretary's contention that OSHA provisions
compelled an employer to submit to an inspection. Refusing to hold the
inspection procedures unconstitutional under either the fourth or fifth
amendments, the court pointed out that "[tihe statute does not explicitly
authorize warrantless searches. While it does authorize entries 'without
delay,' this is not an unambiguous equivalent for 'without a warrant.' "32
A compliance officer, sent by the Secretary to inspect a worksite, must
present his credentials prior to the inspection, afford walkaround rights
during the inspection to the employer and a representative of the employees,
and at the end of the inspection inform the employer of the safety violations
discovered.3 3 Following an inspection of a worksite, the area director decides
whether to issue a citation and penalty for the alleged violation. 34 The area
director may delegate to a compliance officer the authority to issue "on the
spot" citations, but such citations are infrequent since the area director can
usually be consulted either in person or by telephone. Either way, the area
director reviews the compliance officer's report to determine whether a
citation should issue, and if so, the amount of penalty. 35 The actual issuance
of a citation and penalty is often more burdensome to the Secretary than a
29.

Id.

30. Brennan v. Gibson's Products, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 154 (E.D. Tex. 1976) (appeal to 5th Cir.
filed Feb. 25, 1976). Earlier, a United States District Court in Georgia had held that to require a
special search warrant by the Secretary prior to his inspection under the Act would be "marching
to the beat of an antique drum." Brennan v. Buckeye Indus., Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1350, 1356 (S.D.
Ga. 1974).
31. Brennan v. Gibson's Products, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 154 (E.D. Tex. 1976) (appeal to 5th Cir.
filed Feb. 25, 1976).
32. Id. at 162. Although arising in the United States District Court in the Eastern District of
Texas, a 3-judge panel (Judge Gee, Fifth Circuit, and District Judges Steger and Justice) was
empaneled to hear the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2282(1970). See also In reInspection of Rupp
Forge Co., No. C76-385 (N.D. Ohio, April 29, 1976).
33. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1903.7-.8 (1975); see notes 193-96 infra and accompanying text.
34. There are 63 OSHA area directors in 10 regions covering the 50 states, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.
35. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1903.14-.15 (1975).
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determination that a safety hazard exists at a worksite. First, the area director
must decide which specific standard, if any, out of the thousands in the
regulations, applies.3 6 To prosecute an employer for a hazard for which a
specific standard does not exist, the area director must determine that a
violation of a hazard recognized in the industry as sufficient to constitute a
violation of the general duty clause has occurred. The area director must then
characterize the violation as "willful," "serious," "non-serious," or
"repeated." 37 Finally, the area director must assess a penalty3" and set a date
39
by which the employer must correct the hazard.
Once a citation is issued, an employer may within fifteen working days
contest the citation and penalty by filing written notice of contest with the
Secretary.' Of course, the employer may by inaction choose to allow the
citation and proposed penalty to become final, but if he decides to contest the
citation and penalty, he must assume the burden of notifying the Secretary of
his decision. At this point the employer has no remedy either in administrative
41
proceedings or in the courts.
Finally, the Secretary must serve a written citation on the employer42 with
36. There are thousands of specific safety standards for employers to follow. Construction
employers, for example, have a thousand specific safety standards that apply to their activities
alone. Id. § 1926.
37. The Act defines a "serious violation." 29 U.S.C. § 666(j) (1970). "Willful,
nonserious," and "repeated" are not defined in the statute but are found in the Code of Federal
Regulations. The Act requires the Secretary to make specific findings before the violation is
characterized as not serious. Id.
38. Id. § 666(i).
39. Id. § 658(a).
40. The Act seems to require the employer to specify whether he is contesting the citation,
the penalty, or both.
If, after an inspection or investigation, the Secretary issues a citation under
section 658(a) of this title, he shall, within a reasonable time after the termination
of such inspection or investigation, notify the employer by certified mail of the
penalty, if any, proposed to be assessed under section 666 of this title and that the
employer has fifteen working days within which to notify the Secretary that he
wishes to contest the citation or proposed assessment of penalty. If, within
fifteen working days from the receipt of the notice issued by the Secretary the
employer fails to notify the Secretary that he intends to contest the citation or
proposed assessment of penalty, and no notice is filed by any employee or
representative of employees under subsection (c) of this section within such time,
the citation and the assessment, as proposed, shall be deemed a final order of the
Commission and not subject to review by any court or agency.
Id. § 659(a). The employer may also contest the classification of the citation as willful, serious, or
repeated. As a practical matter, a contest of both citation and penalty is advisable, especially if
the employer is not sure of the applicable safety standard. During the first four years of OSHA an
employer who filed a contest to an assessed penalty but later discovered that the cited safety
standard did not apply to his hazard, found himself unable to amend his notice of contest. Florida
East Coast Properties, Inc., 6 O.S.A.H.R.C. 404, 1 O.S.H.C. 1532 (1974) (No. 2354). The Fifth
Circuit has suggested to the Secretary, however, that he relax the employer's duty to denote
whether his contest is to the citation, the penalty or to both. See OSHRC v. Bill Echols Trucking
Co., 487 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1973). Since the Secretary did not incorporate any forms or new
procedures following the Fifth Circuit court's decision, the Review Commission adopted a new
rule which allows the employer to amend his notice of contest after the 15-day working period to
cover both citation and penalty. Presumably, this amendment privilege extends to the time that an
OSHRC judge makes a decision in the case. William W. Turnbull, 3 O.S.H.C. 1781 (Dec. 15,
1975) (No. 7413). Nevertheless, the employer must still give some notice of contest within the
15-day working period to benefit from this rule.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 659(a) (1970), quoted in note 40 supra.
42. Service of the citation and proposed penalty must be made on a corporate officer and not
a jobsite superintendent. Buckley & Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 507 F.2d 78 (3d Cir. 1975). The
citation must identify the employer, the worksite, the hazard, the penalty, and a period for
abatement.
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after the inspection. If the employer does not

raise the issue of improper service before an OSHRC judge, then the employer's right to contest improper service is waived." An employer also has
the burden to raise the issue of improper service.
B. Powers and Duties of OSHRC
Once notice of contest is received by the Secretary from an employer, the

burden is on the Secretary to forward the notice of contest to OSHRC in
Washington,45 and prepare the Secretary's complaint. 46 Upon receipt of a

notice of contest OSHRC assigns the case a number and a hearing judge.
Procedures as to pleadings, discovery, stipulations, and a non-jury hearing
before the OSHA judge 47 accord with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Thereafter, the judge makes findings of facts, renders an opinion, and advises
the parties that the decision is final unless OSHRC grants a review of the case
within thirty days. 48

The Review Commission may grant a review of a judge's decision upon
application by an employer or upon its own motion. 49 The Commission may
affirm, modify, or reverse the judge's decision. In addition, the Commission

may raise or lower the penalty determined by the judge. The imposition by
OSHRC of greater penalties than those proposed by the Secretary, however,

has been criticized by the courts." Nevertheless, the Commission's decision
is a final order 1 and thereafter appealable to a United States court of appeals.
OSHRC is viewed by the courts as an agency empowered to reach a
43. Seven days after the inspection has been held to be "reasonable promptness." L.D.L.
Land Dev. Co., 8 O.S.A.H.R.C. 418, 1 O.S.H.C. 3099 (1974) (No. 3248).
44. In one case service did not take place until eighty-three days after inspection. Nevertheless, since the employer did not raise the improper service issue before the hearing judge,
OSHRC did not consider it. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 70.S.A.H.R.C. 1128, 1O.S.H.C. 1689
(1974) (No. 1105).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1970).
46. The Secretary's complaint will not contain allegations which are not contained in the
citation or notice of penalty, although in case of conflicts in cited safety standards and multicitation situations the order of the allegations may be significant.
47. Early attacks by employers stressed the unconstitutionality of the Act on grounds that
while the Act provides for monetary fines up to $10,000 and possible jail sentences of six months,
there is no provision for a jury trial. On March 22, 1976, the Supreme Court granted writs of
certiorari in two cases for review of the seventh amendment question under the Act. Frank Irey,
Jr., Inc. v. OSHRC, 519 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. granted,96 S.Ct. 1458, 47 L. Ed. 2d 731
(1976) (No. 75-748); Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 518 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96
S. Ct. 1458, 47 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1976) (No. 75-746). These two cases have been consolidated. The
majority of both circuit courts denied the employers' claims of unconstitutionality by virtue of
the seventh amendment, but the well-reasoned dissenting opinion of Judge Gibbons in the Frank
Irey, Jr. case is significant. 519 F.2d at 1219-26.
48. The Rules of Procedure of OSHRC are published in 29 C.F.R. §§ 2200.1-. 10 (1975).
49. Any of the three members of the Review Commission may order a review. The Commission has long been divided as to whether OSHRC may review a judge's decision on a point not
raised by any party before the judge. See, e.g., Hartwell Excavating Co., 4 O.S.H.C. 1263 (May
21, 1976) (No. 3841). The majority holding is that OSHRC is limited to the actual issues raised
before the judge.
50. Dale M. Madden Constr., Inc. v. Hodgson, 502 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1974). Employers have
also asserted in the courts that the power and inclination of OSHRC to raise proposed penalties,
as well as the provision that the penalties continue to accrue due to non-abatement during the
contest, discourages employers from exercising their statutory right of contest and appeal, and
creates thereby a "chilling effect" on the employers' actions. The Supreme Court has rejected
opportunity to review this issue.
51. Dan J. Sheehan Co. v. Dunlop, 520 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1458,
47 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1976). Motions by parties for a rehearing before the Review Commission have
been consistently overruled.
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decision by findings of fact and conclusions of law.5 2 In practice, however,
OSHRC, similar to an appellate body, may affirm, reverse, or modify a
hearing judge's decision depending upon whether a preponderance of the
evidence supports the judge's decision." Despite the fact that the courts view
a judge's decision as a final decision of OSHRC, an unreviewed judge's

decision is not binding upon other judges. 54
C.

Court Review: The Substantial Evidence Test

The employer, employees, or the Secretary may file a notice of appeal to

the United States court of appeals only after they have exhausted all their
administrative remedies. The scope of circuit court review is limited to legal
issues: OSHA provides that "[tihe findings of the Commision with respect to
questions of fact, if supported by substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive." 5 5 The burden of the initial determination of constitutional issues rests with the court because OSHRC refuses to
rule upon a constitutional question raised by the parties. Otherwise, the court
is empowered to pass generally only on those matters raised before OSHRC
and preserved in the record by the parties for appellate review.56

II. THE SECRETARY OF LABOR'S BURDEN OF PROOF OF JURISDICTION
The Secretary's burden of proof in a proceeding under OSHA is clear from
the language of the statute. The Secretary has the burden of showing by a
preponderance of the evidence 57 the three jurisdictional elements: the existence of affected employees, a workplace as defined by the statute, and a

business affecting interstate commerce. In addition, the Secretary must show
the five elements of a violation of either the general duty clause or a specific
safety standard: the existence of a hazard, exposure of employees to the

hazard, knowledge by the employer of the hazard, knowledge by the employer of the violation, and the failure of the employer to correct the hazardous condition.
The rules and regulations originally enacted by OSHRC and published in
1971 merely required the Secretary to offer proof necessary "to sustain the

assertions contained in his citation, notification of proposed penalty, and
notification of failure to correct a violation.' '58 In 1972, however, the Secre52. Accu-Namics, Inc. v. OSHRC, 515 F.2d 828, 834 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct.
1492, 47 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1976): "[T]he Commission itself is charged with findings of fact. The
judge's 'decision' is merely a report, weighty of course, but not final ....
53. Hamilton Lumber Co., 4 O.S.H.C. 1273, 1274 (May 24, 1976) (No. 9764): "[Wlith
respect to the evidentiary issues raised by [the employer], it is sufficient that [the judge] weighed
the evidence and that his findings are supported by the preponderance of the evidence."
54. Hartwell Excavating Co., 4 O.S.H.C. 1263 (May 21, 1976) (No. 3841); Accu-Namics,
Inc. v. OSHRC,515 F.2d828(5thCir. 1975), cert. denied,96S. Ct. 1492,47L. Ed. 2d752(1976).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1970).
56. The Secretary and the Review Commission are in dispute concerning the power to
interpret standards. The courts have refused to resolve the dispute as between the Secretary and
the Review Commission, leaving resolution of the issue to the two agencies of the executive
branch or to the Congress. Brennan v. OSHRC, 505 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1974).
57. The term "preponderance of the evidence" is not, of course, synonymous with the terms
substantial evidence" or "beyond a reasonable doubt." While the decision of OSHRC is
affirmed by the courts if supported by substantial evidence, the Secretary before OSHRC need
only prove his case by the preponderance of the evidence.
58. Rules of Procedure of OSHRC, 36 Fed. Reg. 17415 (1971).
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tary's burden of proof was enlarged to include "all proceedings commenced
by the filing of a notice of contest." 9 If the Secretary contends a particular
violation was "willful," "non-serious," or "repeated," then he must allege
and prove that fact because OSHA presumes that all violations are classified
as "serious" violationsA° This proof is especially important to employers
because the classification of the violation determines the maximum penalty
6
that either the Secretary or OSHRC can assess. '
An Employer.An "employer" is defined by OSHA as "a person engaged in a
business affecting commerce who has employees, but does not include the
United States or any State or political subdivision of a State." 62 This definition has frequently been the subject of disputes regarding who is actually the
employer of persons exposed to hazardous conditions. For example, the
employer may contest a violation on grounds that the employees in question
are loaned employees, or employees of a subcontractor, materialman, or
supplier, or even volunteers. As a result, the multi-employer worksite has
been the subject of extensive court interpretations, and, recently, of a new
OSHRC rule. 63 An employer now has the burden of showing that the employees exposed to the hazard did not belong to the employer, or that the
hazard was not created by, under the control of, nor subject to correction by,
the employer.
An employer has some non-delegable duties under OSHA. For instance, in
Dayton Tire & Rubber Co.64 OSHRC held that an employer was responsible
under OSHA for record-keeping requirements even though the employer had
contracted with a personnel referral service to do that work. Citing Brennan
v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc.,65 the Commission stated that a determination of who
is an "employer" should take into consideration the purpose of the reporting
requirements and the economic reality of the situation.
Affected Employees. The Secretary has the burden of showing that there are
"affected employees" of the employer and that said employees are exposed
to the hazardous conditions constituting the safety violation. An "employee"
is defined by OSHA as one "who is employed in a business of his employer
which affects commerce."66 The cases applying this definition have considered whether an employee was exposed to a hazard and have concluded that
59. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.73(b) (1975). In a petition for modification of abatement the petitioner
has the burden of showing the necessity for the requested modification. Id.
60. 29 U.S.C. 88 666(b), (c), (j) (1970). See California Stevedore & Ballast Co. v. OSHRC.
493 F.2d 1064 (9th Cir. 1975).
61. See 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1970) (willful or repeated: $10,000 fine); id. § 666(b) (serious:
$1,000 fine); id. § 666(c) (non-serious: $1,000 fine); id. § 666(d) (failure to abate violation:
$1,000 per day); id. § 666(e) (willful violation resulting in death: $10,000 and six months' prison);
id. § 666(f) (person giving advance notice of inspection: $1,000 fine and/or six months' prison);
id. § 666(g) (false statements of records: $10,000 fine and/or six months' prison); id. § 666(h)
(employer who violates posting requirements: $1,000). Seediscussion at text accompanying note
146 infra regarding penalty.
62. 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (1970).
63. See discussion at text accompanying notes 106-19 infra regarding Anning Johnson rule.
64. 15 O.S.A.H.R.C. 290, 2 O.S.H.C. 1528 (1975) (No. 2719), aff'd in unpublished opinion,
No. 75-1316 (D.C. Cir., June 10, 1976).
65. 504 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1974).
66. 29 U.S.C. § 652(6) (1970). Such definition is of little assistance in defining "employee.'
From the wording of OSHA it is not plain whether an employee whose activities are not related to
the employer's business affecting commerce is covered under OSHA.
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all employers whose employees are exposed to a hazardous condition are
liable under OSHA, regardless of whether the employer created, was
responsible for, or could not eliminate the hazard. An employer who could
have eliminated the hazard is liable regardless of whether an employee was
actually exposed to the hazard.
This interpretation of "employee" appears inconsistent with OSHA's original intention to hold an employer responsible only for the safety of his own
employees.67 Nevertheless, the trend is to hold an "employer" liable for a
violation of a safety standard if the "employer" creates, controls, or has the
power to correct a hazardous condition regardless of whether any employee is
present or whether anyone injured is an employee.A Accordingly, the Secretary has cited two separate employers for the existence of a single hazardous
situation, alleging that the exposed workmen were employees of both em69
ployers at the same time.
A Work Place. The Secretary has the burden of proving the existence of a
worksite, a place of employment, or a place where work is performed. 70 The
burden is easily met since any site where any employee is working constitutes
a "place of employment." 71 Generally, employers have been unsuccessful in
refuting the Secretary's contention that a particular worksite is a "place of
employment" even in the extreme case where employees were working in
72
prohibited or unauthorized areas.
Business Affecting Interstate Commerce. Since the language of OSHA is
phrased as broadly as possible, the Secretary's burden with respect to "busi67. Id. § 654(a) merely requires the employer to furnish to each of the employees a safe place
of employment. This provision, however, is found only in the general duty clause provision, §
(a)(]). The specific safety standard, § (a)(2), has no such limitation, and the court in Anning
Johnson, discussed at notes 106-19 infra, soon found and probed this fissure to broaden the scope
of an employer's responsibility.
68. Two volunteers were in a sandtrap. The sandtrap collapsed, killing one and injuring the
other. The "employer" responsible for the existence of the sandtrap was found in violation of a
safety standard by an OSHRC judge even though there was no evidence that either volunteer was
an "employee," and the surviving volunteer denied being an "employee." The judge presumed
the employer-employee relationship and the acts of the volunteers as somehow being beneficial
to the employer. Arlie R. Hawk, General Contractor, 4 0.S.H.C. 1248 (May 19, 1976) (No. 6688).
The Review Commission affirmed the decision. The majority of the Commission found, as did
the judge, that " '[it strains credulity that two grown men tarried at a construction site for the
better part of a day then leaped into a 13-foot excavation to spread sand with shovels merely for
the sake of friendship and healthful exercise.' " Id. The dissenting commissioner rejoined, with
equal logic, that "[one] could wonder why [the employer] would employ two men to stand around
his worksite for the better part of a day just so he would have them there for a few minutes in
order to do light sand-smoothing work." Id. at 1249. But seeS.H. Pridgeon-Lo ging Contractor,
13 O.S.A.H.R.C. 71, 2 O.S.H.C. 3210 (1974) (No. 7092) (judge dismissed acitation against an
employer whose employee was killed while voluntarily helping another employer, an exempt
municipal utilities company, to clear trees from power lines in violation of a specific safety
standard).
69. Godwin-Bevers Co., 14 O.S.A.H.R.C. 723, 20.S.H.C. 1470(1975) (No. 1373);Weicker
Transfer & Storage Co., 15 O.S.A.H.R.C. 80, 20.S.H.C. 1493 (1975) (No. 1362) ("an employer"
becomes "the employers").
70. A "site" may include moving vehicles, airplanes, or other mobile sites under the control
of an employer.
71. Specifically, OSHA imposes a duty on the employer to furnish a safe "place of employment." 29 U.S.C. §§ 654(a), 651(b)(1) (1970). To enforce the imposition of this duty OSHA
authorizes the Secretary to inspect any "factory, plant, establishment, construction site, or other
area, workplace or environment where work is performed by an employee of an employer
. I d. § 657(a)(1).
72. REA Express, Inc. v. Brennan, 495 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1974).
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ness affecting commerce" is virtually non-existent. The definitions of "employer" 7 3 and "employee" 74 contain the broad phrase "business affecting
commerce" which is "a phrase often used when Congress means to signal an
intention to go beyond the regulation of businesses engaged 'in commerce.'
According to one of the authors of the statute, Congress intended
to make "[t]he coverage of this bill . . . as broad generally speaking as the
authority vested in the Federal Government by the commerce clause of the
constitution." '76 Thus, OSHRC and the courts have for the most part sustained the Secretary's burden by interpreting "business affecting commerce"
to include the purchase of equipment and insurance policies produced by
out-of-state sources, 77 employer-supplied services to other businesses
of supplies produced by out-ofengaged in interstate commerce, and the use
7
state sources, even if purchased locally. 1
Although the Secretary clearly has the burden to show an employer is
engaged in a business affecting commerce, one commissioner in a recent case
voted to require an employer to demonstrate that his business was not one
"affecting commerce." 79 This commissioner would also prohibit OSHRC
from disposing of an employer's "not affecting commerce" claim on the
ground that OSHRC rules reserve constitutional questions for court review."°
These proposals have little merit. The commissioner has confused matters
required to be included in a citation2 by the Secretary' with jurisdictional
8
matters necessary for a complaint.
'75

III.

THE SECRETARY OF LABOR'S BURDEN OF PROOF:
VIOLATION OF OSHA

Burden of Proof.The Secretary has the burden of proving whether an employer has violated a particular provision of OSHA. The amount of proof
necessary to meet the burden will vary according'to whether the cited em73. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
74. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
75. Brennan v. OSHRC,492 F.2d 1027, 1030 (2d Cir. 1974).
76. 116 CONG. REC. 42199, 42206 (1970) (Congressman Steiger).
77. United States v. Dye Constr. Co., 510 F.2d 78 (10th Cir. 1975).
78. Brennan v. OSHRC, 492 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1974). In Franklin R. Lacy, however, the
Secretary's citation was dismissed for failure to prove the employer was engaged in interstate
commerce even though an employer, building his own apartment addition, was shown to be using
tools purchased from Sears, Roebuck & Company and lumber from Weyerhaeuser, two obvious
interstate businesses. 4 O.S.H.C. 1115 (April 5, 1976) (No. 3701) (judge's decision). OSHRC
affirmed the judge's dismissal. The Review Commission's opinion is dependent upon whether a
judge should take either "judicial notice" or "official notice" of the interstate commerce nature
of a business. The Secretary is expected to appeal the case.
79. Anchorage Plastering Co., 18 O.S.A.H.R.C. 459, 30.S.H.C. 1284(1975) (No. 3322). The
Commission by a one-to-one split decision affirmed the judge's decision to vacate the citation for
failure of the Secretary to meet his burden of proof with respect to jurisdiction. The case has
been appealed to the Ninth Circuit. Appeal docketed, No. 75-2747,9th Cir., Aug. 8, 1975. In view
of the stipulations in that case as to the employer's use of supplies from interstate commerce, and
the employer's work on buildings for firms that are engaged in interstate commerce, the indication is that the Ninth Circuit will reverse OSHRC and reinstate the citations.
80. Id. at 460, 3 O.S.H.C. at 1285.
81. See 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1970).
82. Les Mares Enterprises, Inc., 16 O.S.A.H.R.C. 854, 30.S.H.C. 1015 (1975) (No. 2455),
appeal docketed, No. 75-2196, 9th Cir., June 27, 1975. The Ninth Circuit is expected to leave the
burden of proof on the Secretary to show that the employer is engaged in a business affecting
commerce.
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ployer has allegedly violated the general duty clause or one of OSHA's specific
safety standards. 3 Under the general duty clause the Secretary must demonstrate that (1) the employer's workplace is not free of safety hazard, (2) the
safety hazard is one recognized as a hazard in the industry or business of the
employer, s4 and (3)
the hazard is likely to cause death or serious physical harm
85
to the employees.
A specific safety standard takes precedence over the general duty clause.
Consequently, both OSHRC and the courts will dismiss the Secretary's
citation when a specific safety standard is shown by the employer to be
applicable and the Secretary has issued the citation based upon the general
duty clause. 6 If the application of a specific safety standard is raised successfully by the employer in the initial hearing, the Secretary can usually exercise

87
the right to amend his complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to allege violation of the specific standard raised by the employer at the initial
hearing.88 Since failure to allege the inapplicability of the general duty clause

constitutes a waiver of that specific defense, 8 9 the employer must raise an
argument sufficient to preserve error with respect to the applicability of a
specific safety standard, but insufficient to persuade the Secretary to amend
the citation to allege violation of the specific safety standard. Regardless of

the complaint, under OSHA administrative procedures OSHRC may find the
proper violation even if the Secretary fails to assert the correct safety standard in the citation.
In NationalRealty & Construction Co. v. OSHRC90 the issue before the
court was the Secretary's burden of proof under the general duty clause. The
specific inquiry was directed toward what constitutes a failure by an em-

ployer to render a workplace "free" of a hazard. 9 The court noted that an
employer is neither strictly liable for injuries occurring at the place of employ-

ment nor responsible for unpreventable hazards, nor is he expected to make
extreme efforts to prevent hazards. The Secretary's failure to introduce

evidence showing how the worksite could have been rendered free of the
hazard convinced the court that the employer could not be held liable for the
alleged hazard. 92 OSHRC cannot create a theory for the Secretary nor speculate outside the record about what the employer might have done to correct
83. 29 U.S.C. §§ 654(a)(1), (2) (1970).
84. Id. § 654(a)(1).
85. The Act does not provide in the stated purposes, the general duty clause, or the specific
standards any reference to mental or psychological harm to employees. Accordingly, the threat
of physical harm to employees is not protected under OSHA unless that threat is either a
recognized hazard in the industry or has been defined as a safety standard.
86. Godwin-Bevers Co., 14 O.S.A.H.R.C. 723, 2 O.S.H.C. 1470 (1975) (No. 1373).
87. FED. R. Civ. P. 15.
88. This should be appropriately called "The Secretary of Labor's Shifting Sands
Doctrine."
89. See note 86 supra and accompanying text.
90. 489 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
91. Id. at 1267. An employee, while riding as a passenger on a front-end loader, was killed
when the machine went out of control. This accident occurred before the promulgation of
specific standards by the Secretary that would now apply to this situation. The Secretary relied
heavily on the death of the employee to show a violation by the employer.
92. The court stated that "the hearing record [was] barren of evidence describing and
demonstrating the feasibility and likely utility of the particular measures which [the employer]
should have taken to improve its safety policy. Having the burden of proof, the Secretary must be
charged with these evidentiary deficiencies." Id.
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the situation. 93 To prevail under the general duty clause the Secretary must
formulate and demonstrate94 a safety method by which an employer could have
protected his employees.
A specific safety standard requires the Secretary to prove all the essential
elements stated in that standard and the definitions related thereto. 9 The
citation must state with particularity the elements of violation contained in the
standard. Thus, oral statements by a compliance officer to an employer
relating to deviations from the standard are not sufficient to allege a violation.' In addition, if the Secretary alleges and proves a violation of the
general duty clause when a specific standard should have applied to the
situation, the citation should be vacated unless the parties tried the issues
under the specific standard by consent. 97
The various courts and the Review Commission have not consistently
applied the specific safety standards to a given set of facts. For example, the
standard for the guarding of opensided floors9" has been expressly held by two
courts of appeals not to apply to the guarding of flat roofs. 99 OSHRC insisted,
however, that its contrary interpretation of that standard applied and was to
be binding on OSHRC judges until such time as the Supreme Court ruled on
the OSHRC interpretation. °0 As a result, OSHRC judges followed the
OSHRC interpretation unless the judge was sitting in a circuit which had
overruled the OSHRC interpretation. 0101 2OSHRC finally acquiesced to the
interpretation of the courts of appeals.
Existence of a Hazard.Upon the issuance of a citation under the general duty
clause or a specific safety standard the Secretary must demonstrate the
existence of a "hazard" or a dangerous situation which may result in injury or
death to an employee.0 3 Under the general duty clause a hazard is shown by
reference to safety standards of the industry. The existence of a hazard is
presumed, however, in the case of a work situation encompassed by one of
OSHA's specific safety standards,"°4 and evidence that a worksite situation
93. The majority of OSHRC had, in this decision, speculated about what the employer could
have done to upgrade its safety program. The court stated that the Commissioners had attempted,
in effect, "to serve as expert witnesses for the Secretary," and that this was not their function.
Id. at 1267 n.40.
94. This requirement upon the Secretary assures "even handed enforcement of the general
duty clause." Id. at 1268.
95. For example, an alleged violation of a trenching standard must show that the sides of the
trench are in "unstable" [soil] or [soil of] "soft material." 29 C.F.R. § 1926.652(b) (1975).
"Unstable" soil is defined in the standard, but "soft material" is not. Id. § 1926.653(q).
96. B.W. Harrison Lumber Co., 4 O.S.H.C. 1091 (1975) (No. 2200).
97. Godwin-Bevers Co., 14 O.S.A.H.R.C. 723, 2 O.S.H.C. 1470 (1975) (No. 1373).
98. 29 C.F.R. § 1926.500(d)(1) (1975).
99. Diamond Roofing Co. v. Usery, 528 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1976); Langer Roofing & Sheet
Metal, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 524 F.2d 1337 (7th Cir. 1975).
100. See, e.g., Grossman Steel & Aluminum Corp., 4 O.S.H.C. 1185 (1975) (No. 12775).
101. See OSHRC Judge Burroughs' opinion in Western Waterproofing Co., 9 O.S.A.H.R.C.
979, 2 O.S.H.C. 3083 (1976) (No. 14237) (judge's decision). OSHRC has directed a review. Judge

Burroughs was writing before the opinion of the Fifth Circuit in Diamond Roofing Co. v. Usery,

528 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1976).
102. Central City Roofing Co., 4 O.S.H.C. 1286 (June 4, 1976) (No. 8173).
103. A "hazard" is implicitly defined as a dangerous condition which may result in injury or
death to an employee. 29 U.S.C. § 654 (1970).
104. SeeLee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 511 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1975).
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has existed for a long period of time without injury or death to any employee
will not overcome that presumption." 5
Employee Exposure to Hazard. One of the most noticeable changes in the
burden of proof requirements under OSHA is the "employee exposure to
hazard" element. The Review Commission originally required the Secretary
to show that employees of the cited employer were "exposed" to the
hazard. 10 The Commission later modified its position to require the Secretary
10 7
to show that employees had "access" to the hazardous condition. Most
recently, the Commission has stated that the Secretary need not show that
any employees were exposed or had access to a hazardous condition; rather,
the burden of proof is on the employer to show that no employee was
exposed. 108 Naturally, the courts are divided with respect to the applicability
of the rules and the Commission's modifications. The Fourth Circuit follows
the Commission's original rule'09 while the Second Circuit follows the rule as
first modified. 10 The same question is now on appeal in the Sixth Circuit,."
but the Seventh Circuit has simply refused to consider the question." 2
In a related context, burden of proof requirements have also changed with
respect to a showing of whose employees were exposed to a hazard. Originally, the Secretary was required to show that employees of the cited employer were exposed. 113 The Second Circuit modified this rule to require the
Secretary to demonstrate only that an employer is in control of a hazardous
condition or has created a hazardous condition. Under the modification the
Secretary need only establish that the hazard was accessible to any employee. 114 None of the circuits explicitly follows either the original rule or its
modified version; rather, the circuits are in discord with respect to the degree
of control necessary to hold an employer liable. The Ninth Circuit, for
example, has held that the lessor of hazardous equipment and not the lessee
was responsible for complying with the standards." 15 The Tenth Circuit, on
the other hand, has held that a showing by the Secretary that an employer had
control over the employee of another was sufficient to justify the citation.116
Generally, circuits focus on control over the employee or control over the
105. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. Brennan, 497 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1974).
106. Bechtel Corp., 12 O.S.A.H.R.C. 774, 20.S.H.C. 1336(1974)(No. 1038). Butseedissent
of Commissioner Cleary that is now the majority opinion since Underhill C0nstr. Corp., 20
O.S.A.H.R.C. 535, 4 O.S.H.C. 1051 (1976) (No. 3257).
107. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 4 O.S.A.H.R.C. 1080, I O.S.H.C. 1388 (1973) (No. 504), rev'd,
504 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1974).
108. Underhill Constr. Corp., 20 O.S.A.H.R.C. 535, 4 O.S.H.C. 1051 (1976) (No. 3257).
109. Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1975).
110. Brennan v. OSHRC, 513 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1975).
III. Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Secretary of Labor, appeal docketed, No. 75-1672, 6th
Cir., June 12, 1975.
112. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., II O.S.A.H.R.C. 933, 2 O.S.H.C. 3157 (1974) (No. 224),
appeal dismissed, No. 73-1181, 7th Cir., May 31, 1975.
113. Brennan v. Gilles & Cotting, Inc., 504 F.2d 1255 (4th Cir. 1975).
114. The employee need not be an employee of the cited employer. Brennan v. OSHRC, 513
F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1975).
115. Frohlick Crane Serv. v. OSHRC, 521 F.2d 628 (9th Cir. 1975).
116. Clarkson Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 531 F.2d 451 (10th Cir. 1976).
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situation; at least one circuit, however, would vary the responsibilities
depending upon whether the violation is serious or non-serious." 7
The Review Commission has recently adopted a rule" 8 which incorporates
the Second and Seventh Circuits' modifications but is not limited to serious
violations. The Review Commission will now affirm citations issued against
employers who (a) have their employees exposed to the hazard, or (b) create
the hazard, or (c) have control over the hazard. This rule is expressly aimed at
the multi-employer worksite situation common among building construction
employers. The rule requires an employer to demonstrate that he has made
reasonable efforts or taken realistic protective measures to eliminate a
hazardous condition regardless of whether the condition is one of his creation
or under his control. " 9 An employer who has created or controls a hazardous
condition remains responsible to any and all employees.
Employer's Knowledge of a Hazard.As well as showing that a hazard exists,
the Secretary must demonstrate that an employer knows or should know of
the hazard. One court, applying a "reasonable, prudent man" test, has held
that the Secretary must show either that an employer had actual knowledge of
a hazard, or that the employer's conduct was "unacceptable in light of the0
common understanding and experience of those working in the industry.'12
On the other hand, OSHRC has held that an employer's actual knowledge of a
hazard is insufficient to warrant a citation and penalty under the general duty
clause unless the alleged hazard is a condition recognized in the employer's
industry or business as hazardous.' 21Nevertheless, one OSHRC decision has
been reversed on the ground that the record did not contain evidence which
established the safety practice as one recognized in the employer's industry.' 22 Knowledge of the hazard, therefore, was imputed to the employer, and
chance to prove the employer's
the Secretary, in effect, was granted a second
23
condition.
hazardous
the
of
knowledge
Employer's Knowledge of a Violation. Having established an employer's24
knowledge of a hazardous condition, the Secretary must next demonstrate'
that the employer knew or should have known, according to the standards of
the industry, that the condition was in violation of OSHA. The courts have
refused to impute knowledge of a violation of OSHA unless the employer had
knowledge of a hazardous condition or had failed to institute an adequate
117. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits follow the original position set out in Gilles & Cotting,
although the Seventh Circuit has applied a modified position in the case of a serious violation. See
Anning-Johnson Co., v. OSHRC, 516 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1975), noted in 62 VA. L. REV. 788
(1976); Southeast Contractors, Inc. v. Dunlop, 512 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 1975).
118. Anning-Johnson Co., 4 O.S.H.C. 1193 (May 12, 1976) (Nos. 3694 and 4409); see Commissioner Moran's vigorous dissent, id. at 1200-03.
119. Id. at 1199.
120. Cape & Vineyard Div. v. OSHRC, 512 F.2d 1148, 1152 (Ist Cir. 1975).
121. But under some circumstances actual knowledge of a hazard by the employer is sufficient to warrant a citation and penalty under the general duty clause (even if the hazard is not one
recognized in the industry). Brennan v. OSHRC, 494 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1974).
122. Brennan v. Smoke-Craft, Inc., 530 F.2d 843 (9th Cir. 1976).
123. Id. at 845.
124. Despite his objections, the burden of proof rests with the Secretary. Brennan v.
OSHRC, 511 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1975).
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safety training and supervising program.'

25

Generally, a court will impute

knowledge of a violation if an employer could have reasonably foreseen harm
to an employee from a hazardous condition. 2 6 The question of whether the
harm was reasonably foreseeable has been confused in some cases by an
employer's attempt to show that the cause of the harm was a rare

occurrence.

127

The Employer's Failure To Correctthe Violation. If an employer fails to abate
a violation after he has received a citation, the Secretary may issue a.second
citation. 128 For a second citation to issue, the Secretary must demonstrate that
the employer has failed to abate the violation, and, if the initial citation was
uncontested by an employer, which is frequently the case, then a necessary
element of proof of failure to abate is proof of the original hazard. In other
words, the violation for which the employer was initially cited will not be
29
presumed for the second citation.
Classificationof the Violation. A violation of OSHA is placed into one of four

categories: willful, serious, non-serious, and repeated. A willful violation,
13

3
unfortunately, is not defined by OSHA. ' As may be expected, OSHRC 1
132
and the courts
have defined the term differently. Consequently, what the

125. Horne Plumbing & Heating Co. v. OSHRC, 528 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1976). See also
Brennan v. OSHRC, 502 F.2d 946 (3d Cir. 1974), remanded to OSHRC and citation still vacated
by OSHRC, 18 O.S.A.H.R.C. 154, 3 O.S.H.C. 1198 (1975) (No. 89); Brennan v. OSHRC, 501
F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1974).
126. The employer is not required to supervise every employee every minute of every
working day. See Horne Plumbing & Heating Co. v. OSHRC, 528 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1976).
127. See, e.g., Robert W. Winzinger, Inc., 4 O.S.H.C. 1475 (July 22, 1976) (No. 6790). See also
note 186 infra and accompanying text.
128. 29 U.S.C. § 666(d) (1970).
129. Kit Mfg. Co., 16 O.S.A.H.R.C. 80, 2 O.S.H.C. 1672 (1975) (No. 603). One dissenting
Commissioner would place the burden of proof upon the employer to rebut the presumption of an
initial violation. Id. at 82, 2 O.S.H.C. at 1675.
130. 29 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1970).
131. OSHRC has defined "willful" conduct as "intentional, knowing, or voluntary conduct,
as distinguished from accidental conduct ... marked by careless disregard." C.N. Flagg & Co.
d/b/a Northeastern Contracting Co., 15 O.S.A.H.R.C. 379, 2 O.S.H.C. 1539 (1975) (No. 1409).
One OSHRC judge has so confused the meaning of "willful" as to define it as follows: "[A]
'serious' violation committed 'wilfully' will be found whenever an employer consciously and
intentionally causes or allows conditions constituting a 'serious' violation to exist, and either
knows that these conditions might violate the requirements of the Act or is plainly indifferent to
his compliance responsibilites under the Act." Ford Motor Co., CCH 1975-76 OSHD 20,626
(March 15, 1976) (No. 13682) (judge's decision; review ordered by OSHRC on March 22, 1976).
OSHRC has also held that a violation is not "willful" if an employer simply persists in his claim
that no violation has occurred but desists from the activity that has been cited as violative. See
C.N. Flagg & Co. d/b/a Northeastern Contracting Co., 15 O.S.A.H.R.C. 379, 2 O.S.H.C. 1539
(1975) (No. 1409).
132. The First Circuit has defined a "willful" violation to be "a conscious, intentional,
deliberate, voluntary decision." F.X. Messina Constr. Corp. v. OSHRC, 505 F.2d 701,702 (1st
Cir. 1974). The Fourth Circuit has added that "willful means action taken knowledgeably by one
subject to the statutory provisions in disregard of the action's legality. No showing of malicious
intent is necessary .... ." Intercounty Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 522 F.2d 777, 779-80 (4th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 854,47 L. Ed. 2d 82 (I 976). The Third Circuit, however, has opted for
a more restrictive definition: "Willfulness connotes defiance or such reckless disregard of
consequences as to be equivalent to a knowing, conscious, and deliberate flaunting of the Act.
Willful means more than merely voluntary action or omission-it involves an element of obstinate refusal to comply." Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. OSHRC, 519 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir. 1975), cert.
granted, 96 S. Ct. 1458, 47 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1976) (No. 75-748). The court reasoned that so
restrictive a definition was necessary in order to provide a "distinction between a 'serious'
offense and a 'willful' one." Id. The Tenth Circuit has taken a moderate position by adopting its
district court's definition of a "willful" violation as one "done knowingly and purposely by an
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Secretary must prove to establish a willful violation will vary according to the
forum before which the contest is pending. Nevertheless, in all forums the
133
Secretary has the burden of proving the elements of a willful violation,
whatever those elements might be.
A serious violation has been defined by OSHA. 134 The statutory definition
consists of three parts: (1) the existence of a hazardous condition; (2) em135
ployee exposure; and (3) knowledge of the violation by the employer.
Although the Secretary is not required to prove knowledge of the hazard on
the part of the employer, proof that an employer had knowledge of a violation
36
would normally include proof that the employer had knowledge of a hazard.
37
The distinction, nevertheless, may be critical at times. In a Seventh Circuit
case an untrained employee was fatally injured at a hazardous unloading area.
Affirming the OSHRC decision to dismiss the citation, the court refused to
find a serious violation because the employer, while knowing of the potentially hazardous condition, could not have reasonably foreseen exposure to
138
the condition of an untrained employee.
The Secretary of Labor's burden of proof as to the existence of a nonserious violation is the same as the burden for a serious violation except that
he need not show a substantial probability that death or serious injury could
result from the hazardous condition. 39 Thus, the Secretary's attempt to
distinguish between "serious" and "non-serious" in the burden of proving
4
knowledge by the employer of a hazardous condition has been rejected.' 0
Nevertheless, the Secretary must assess some penalty for a serious violation,
4
but need not do so for a non-serious violation.' '
employer who, having a free will or choice, either intentionally disregards the standard or is
plainly indifferent to its requirement. An omission or failure to act is willfully done if done
voluntarily and intentionally." United States v. Dye Constr. Co., 510 F.2d 78,81 (10th Cir. 1975).
The court rejected a contention that an evil motive or moral turpitude is an essential element of a
"willful" violation. Id. at 82.
133. Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. OSHRC, 519 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S.Ct.
1458, 47 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1976) (No. 75-748).
134. 29 U.S.C. § 666(j) (1970) defines "serious" violation as follows:
For purposes of this section, a serious violation shall be deemed to exist in a place
of employment if there is a substantial probability that death or serious physical
harm could result from a condition which exists, or from one or more practices,
means, methods, operations, or processes which have been adopted or are in use,
in such place of employment unless the employer did not, and could not with the
exercise of reasonable diligence, know of the presence of the violation.
135. One OSHRC Commissioner contends that "knowledge" is not an element of a "serious" violation. He would place the burden on the employer to show a lack of knowledge. See
D.R. Johnson Lumber Co., 17 O.S.A.H.R.C. 426,3 O.S.H.C. 1124 (1975) (No. 3179) (Commissioner Cleary, dissenting). Commissioner Cleary bases his reasoning upon the term "unless" in
the statute. See 29 U.S.C. § 666(k) (1970).
136. Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. OSHRC, 519 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct.
1458, 47 L. Ed. 2d 731(1976) (No. 75-748) (to support a finding of a "serious" violation there must
be a finding that the condition was hazardous and that the employer knew or should have known
of the condition).
137. Brennan v. OSHRC, 501 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1974).
138. Id. at 1200. But seeboth the majority and dissenting opinions in Getty Oil Co. v. OSHRC,
530 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir. 1976).
139. RPM Erectors, Inc., I I O.S.A.H.R.C. 319, 2 O.S.H.C. 1187 (1974) (No. 1114); Emory
H. Mixon, 5 O.S.A.H.R.C. 579, I O.S.H.C. 1500 (1973) (No. 403).
140. Brennan v. OSHRC, 511 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir. 1975).
141. Continental Steel Corp., 19 O.S.A.H.R.C. 223, 3 O.S.H.C. 1410 (1975) (No. 3162),
appeal docketed, No. 75-1819, 7th Cir., Sept. 8, 1975. 29 U.S.C. § 666(b) (1970) provides that
employers "shall be assessed a civil penalty of up to $1,000 for each violation." (Emphasis
added.) In contrast, id. § 666(c) provides for non-serious violations: "[Employers] may be
assessed a civil penalty of up to $1,000 for each such violation." (Emphasis added.)
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A repeated violation is also not defined by OSHA, but the Secretary has
defined the violation as one which continues after the employer has been
served with a citation and which is discovered upon a reinspection1 42 One
circuit court143 has held, with questionable reasoning, that a repeated viola-

tion may be an initial violation of a different standard if the standards were
"violated in such a way as to demonstrate a flaunting of the requirements of
the Act."44
Assessment of Penalty. Under OSHA maximum penalties are assessed pursuant to the classification of a violation. 45 In addition, the statute provides
fines or terms of imprisonment for ancillary offenses.146 The Secretary and
the Commission have discretion to assess penalties up to the maximum
provided by the statute. 47 Under the statute the discretion of the Secretary
and the Commission to assess the appropriate penalty means a consideration
of (1) the size of the employer's business, (2) the gravity of the violation, (3)
148
the good faith of the employer, and (4) the employer's previous violations.
One would presume that the employer should raise and prove these four
factors which the area director should treat as mitigating circumstances when
assessing a proposed penalty. These factors, however, are deemed "credits"
in determining a penalty, and OSHA places the burden of demonstrating the
degree of reduction on OSHRC. 149 The Commission shifted this burden to the
Secretary, who promulgated
guidelines for implementing the "reduction" or
"credit" procedures. 51 1
Few cases have questioned the credits granted an employer by the Secretary pursuant to the promulgated guidelines because most employers choose
to ignore the assessed penalty and prefer to defend by challenging the application of a safety standard to their worksite or the existence of the statutory
elements required for a violation. When confronted with the assessment
issue, the courts have considered penalty assessment within the statutory
limit to be a discretionary determination which is not subject to review, rather
than a factual finding which is subject to review.' 51 Moreover, OSHRC
requires that the Secretary establish the appropriateness of the proposed
penalty but"' does not require the Secretary to take into account every
possible credit. '51
142.
143.
144.
145.

OSHA, COMPLIANCE OPERATIONS MANUAL ch. VIII, B, 5 (1974).
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. OSHRC, 4 O.S.H.C. 1451 (July 20, 1976) (No. 75-2301).
Id. at 1454-55 (emphasis added).
29 U.S.C. § 666 (1970). For a list of the fines assessed each classification see note 61

supra.

146. 29 U.S.C. § 666(f) (1970) (giving advance notice of an inspection); id. § 666(g) (filing false
documents); id. § 666(h) (assaulting OSHA personnel).
147. Id. § 666(j).
148. Id. § 666(i).
149. Id.
150. OSHA, COMPLIANCE OPERATIONS MANUAl. ch. XI (1974).
151. Beall Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 507 F.2d 1041 (8th Cir. 1974). The court also refused to
decide whether OSHRC was empowered to increase the penalty proposed by the Secretary. Id. at
1045-46. The Ninth Circuit has answered that question in the affirmative. California Stevedore &
Ballast Co. v. OSHRC, 517 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1975).

152. Colorado Fuel & Iron Steel Corp., 12 O.S.A.H.R.C. 543, 2 O.S.H.C. 1295 (1974) (No.
4054).
153. Tech-Steel, Inc., 12 O.S.A.H.R.C. 529, 2 O.S.H.C. 1266 (1974) (No. 1341).
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Although discretionary, a Secretary's proposed penalty is subject to revision by OSHRC, 154 depending on the facts of the alleged violation and an
employer's actions subsequent to a citation. In a recent case, for example, an
employer, wishing to avoid a citation, sought to frustrate a compliance
officer's inspection of a worksite. In an effort to prevent the compliance
officer's observation of an employee exposed to a hazardous condition, a
prerequisite to a citation, the employer removed all employees from the
worksite during the inspection. Unfortunately for the employer, the scheme
backfired. The OSHRC judge found that the employer's action demonstrated
a lack of "good faith" on the part of the employer, pronounced the violation
55
as "willful," and increased the penalty.1

IV.

THE EMPLOYER'S BURDEN OF PROOF

An employer's dispute with the Secretary may begin as a simple jobsite
dispute between a job foreman and the Secretary's compliance officer. As the
dispute proceeds through the many administrative and judicial stages,
perhaps ultimately to the United States Supreme Court, the litigants are
subjected to many formal and sophisticated trial practices. Although the
primary statutory responsibility under OSHA is compliance with the safety
standards promulgated therein, an employer also has certain ancillary
duties.' 56 After issuance of a citation, an employer must comply with OSHA
procedures for notice of contest if he expects to contest the citation or
penalty, 5 7 and, as a contest develops further, the employer must take responsibility for pleading and proving any general, specific, or procedural defenses
that may exist to an alleged violation.
A.

General Defenses

Once the Secretary has met the burden of establishing that a violation
exists, an employer is entitled to assert affirmative defenses. A general
defense raised by an employer imposes on that employer a burden of proof;
the burden will never shift to the Secretary or OSHRC. The most frequently
asserted general defenses are contentions that the safety standard in question
is vague, indefinite, or inapplicable to a particular worksite, or that the
general duty clause should not apply to the cited employer.
General defenses have enjoyed mixed success. Immediately after the passage of OSHA the courts would almost summarily sustain a Secretary's
interpretation of a safety standard, even if OSHRC had previously declared
the standard vague. 158 Employers continued to challenge vague and indefinite
standards, however, and the courts began to scrutinize more closely OSHRC
decisions when the Secretary failed, after admonitions from the courts, to
154. Robert T. Winzinger, Inc., 4 O.S.H.C. 1475 (July 22, 1976) (No. 6790); seenote 151 supra
and accompanying text.

155. Havens Steel Co., CCH 1975-76 OSHD 20,775 (June 7, 1976) (No. 15538) (judge's
decision; review ordered by OSHRC on June 9, 1976).
156. 29 U.S.C. § 658(b) (1970) (posting); id. § 657(c) (record keeping and reporting).
157. Id. § 659(a).
158. Brennan v. OSHRC, 505 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1974); Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. Brennan,
497 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1974).
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amend the vague language of the standards. With no subsequent action from
the Secretary, judicial criticism became increasingly intense until, finally, the
Eighth Circuit held that the vague language in the standards promulgated by
the Secretary deprived an employer of due process of law. 59 The Fifth Circuit
soon followed this precedent by handing down a decision which greatly
restricts the power of OSHRC to interpret broadly the standards promulgated
by the Secretary. 160 Accordingly, until the Secretary elects to reword many of
the present safety standards, the general defense that a particular standard is
vague and indefinite should continue to prove successful.
An employer may assert as a general defense either that a specific safety
standard under which he has been cited does not apply to his particular
situation, or that a specific safety standard, rather than the general duty
clause cited by the Secretary, is applicable. A problem for an employer with
the latter defense is that the Secretary is allowed wide latitude in amending the
citation and complaint. Thus, an employer asserting this defense may
61
accomplish no more than the correction of the Secretary's pleadings.'
Indeed, OSHRC may on its own motion amend the citation to reflect the
correct standard and, thereafter, rule that the parties tacitly consented to try
the case upon the correct standard because all of the issues material to the
correct standard were heard before the OSHRC judge.162 In any event, the
assertion of a general defense will usually accomplish only a delay of the
proceedings and may help the Secretary, to an employer's detriment, to adopt
a more sustainable posture. An employer is wise, therefore, not to rely
entirely upon a general defense.
B. Specific Defenses
A wide range of specific defenses have been pleaded, proved, and accepted
by both OSHRC and the courts. These defenses are based partly upon an
interpretation by the courts of the statutory language which sets as OSHA's
goal the elimination of health and safety hazards "so far as possible,' 1 63 and
partly upon the judicial finding that OSHA was not intended to make an
employer strictly liable for unavoidable occupational hazards."6 The burden
to allege and prove a specific defense is entirely on the employer.
159.

Brennan v. OSHRC, 513 F.2d 713 (8th Cir. 1975). The court stated specifically that "[i]f

the Secretary desires by this regulation to achieve certain goals which he deems consistent with
the purpose of the Occupational Safety and Health Act but which the wording of the regulation,
as interpreted by the Commission, will not justify, he should amend or clarify it.'" Id. at 716. See
also Brennan v. OSHRC, 488 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1973).
160. Diamond Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 528 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1976). The court reprimanded
the Secretary as follows:
The purpose of OSHA is to obtain safe and healthful working conditions through
promulgation of occupational safety and health standards which tell employers
what they must do to avoid hazardous conditions. To strain the plain and natural
meaning of words for the purpose of alleviating a perceived safety standard is to
delay the day when the occupational safety and health regulations will be written in
clear and concise language so that employers will be better able to understand and
observe them.
Id. at 650.
161.

See notes 86-89 supra and accompanying text.

162. 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1970).
163. 29 U.S.C. § 651(l) (1970).
164. Brennan v. OSHRC, 502 F.2d 946 (3d Cir. 1974).
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Compliance with Standard Impossible. Soon after the enactment of OSHA,
OSHRC held that impossibility of performance by an employer was a valid
defense.165 Courts which have agreed with that holding have reasoned that
OSHA was not intended to eliminate a business or work activity when the
nature of the performance of the work precluded full compliance with a safety
standard." 6 The question which results from this reasoning is what safety
measures in a particular situation are required of the employer for compliance
with OSHA? At present, there is controversy as to whether an employer can
sustain a defense of impossibility of performance by testimony either that he
has no knowledge of a method which would allow him to comply with a
standard, 67 or, in the case of machinery, that a safety device sufficient to
comply with the standard has been neither manufactured nor devised.'68
A trend has yet to emerge from the decisions. In one case an OSHA safety
standard required that platforms six feet or more above the ground be
equipped with guard railings. When an employer who had received a citation
for failure to equip certain platforms with guard railings demonstrated that the
work for which the platforms were deployed could not be performed with the
guard railings in place, OSHRC dismissed the citation. 69 In other cases,
however, the Commission has sustained a citation on grounds that performance was not impossible, but merely inconvenient. 170 In fact, some adminis7
trative judges have refused to recognize impossibility as a defense at all.' '
OSHRC has consistently stated, in any event, that the burden of proof for an
impossibility of performance defense rests entirely with the employer;!72 the
Secretary is not required to show that compliance under a specific standard is
possible.
Interference with Work To Comply with a Safety Standard.The impossibility
of performance defense is closely related to a defense which claims that
compliance with safety standards will create an interference with the work
effort of an employer. The interference defense will not bring about a dismissal of the citation; the defense will merely reduce the penalty for non165. W.C. Sivers Co., I O.S.H.C. 1074 (1972), aff'd citation, 8 O.S.A.H.R.C. 480, I
O.S.H.C. 1733 (1974) (No. 239).
166. For example, in Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467,478 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), the court noted that "Congress does not appear to have intended to protect employees
by putting their employers out of business-either by requiring protective devices unavailable
under existing technology or by making financial viability generally impossible." Compare the
language in AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 120-23 (3d Cir. 1975), in which the court
discussed the question of present technology versus future technology in a study of possibility
versus impossibility of compliances.
167. Hodgdon Shingle & Shake Co., I1 O.S.A.H.R.C. 988, 2 O.S.H.C. 1215 (1974) (No.
1315). But see Clark Equip. Co., 3 O.S.H.C. 1834 (1975) (No. 7925).
168. Lenscraft Optical Corp., 18 O.S.A.H.R.C. 726, 3 O.S.H.C. 1400 (1975) (No. 6628).
169. Underhill Constr. Corp., 15 O.S.A.H.R.C. 366, 2 O.S.H.C. 1556 (1975) (No. 1307); cf.
Robert W. Setterlin & Sons, 4 O.S.H.C. 1214 (May II, 1976) (No. 7377). In that case OSHRC
denied the Secretary's last-minute attempts to amend the citation to change the alleged violation
from failing to install railings to one of failing to install safety nets.
170. K & T Steel Corp., 3 O.S.H.C. 2026 (Feb. 24, 1976) (No. 5769).
171. M.M. Schranz Roofing & Bldg. Supply Co., CCH 1974-75 OSHD 19,364 (1975) (No.
5750) (judge's decision), rev'd by OSHRC on other grounds, 4 O.S.H.C. 1435 (July 7, 1976).
172. U.S. Steel Corp. v. OSHRC, No. 75-2095 (3d Cir., April 30, 1976); Buckeye Indust.,
Inc., 3 O.S.H.C. 1837 (Dec. 22, 1975) (No. 8454).
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compliance.17 3 The current trend toward strict enforcement of safety standards may render this defense of little effect.
A GreaterHazard by Compliance. If an employer can demonstrate that a
greater hazard would be created by compliance with an OSHA standard than
would be created by non-compliance, the employer may apply for a
variance. 174 Even if an employer neglects to apply for a variance, however, an
allegation that compliance will cause a greater hazard may constitute an
affirmative defense. The defense, like other specific defenses, must be estab75
lished by a preponderance of the evidence.
Current Methods Safer than Compliance. An employer may also plead and
prove as a defense that current safety measures are equal, if not superior, to
those required by OSHA standards. 76 The safer measures defense may be
relied upon when two sets of OSHA standards conflict with one another, and
the employer cannot comply with both. In this situation the employer is
forced to guess which standard is the safer method, and he may assert, as an
affirmative defense, that he elected the better method. Once a conflict between two sets of OSHA standards is established, the burden is upon the
Secretary to reconcile the conflicting requirements. 177 Otherwise, the employer has the burden of proving that his current safety measures accomplish
at least the same degree of protection as those urged by the Secretary.
Cost of Compliance Prohibitive.As a general rule, an employer's claim that
the cost of compliance with an OSHA standard is prohibitive is not a valid
defense.' 7 8 Nevertheless, OSHA does recognize the economic hardship the
standards may bring to a small business. The statute, to alleviate that hardship, allows small employers to qualify for loans from the Small Business
Administration in order that the employer may take the steps necessary to
effect compliance with the safety standards.179
Violation as a Rare Occurrence. As a defense an employer may demonstrate
that he was complying with applicable safety standards when an employee, in
an isolated and rare occurrence, violated a safety standard, without the employer's knowledge. When an employer raises this defense, a court will consider whether the employer permitted the employee to break a safety rule, 80
173. H.H. & S. Constr. Co., 15 O.S.A.H.R.C. 795, 2 O.S.H.C. 3303 (1975) (No. 6734)
(employer pleaded impossibility, but administrative judge found only interference).
174. See notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text.
175. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. OSHRC, No. 75-2095 (3d Cir., April 30, 1976); Buckeye lndust.,
Inc., 3 O.S.H.C. 1837 (Dec. 22, 1975) (No. 8454); Kawneer Co., 4 O.S.H.C. 1120 (Feb. 17, 1976)
(No. 11872) (judge's decision); Industrial Steel Erectors, Inc., 6 O.S.A.H.R.C. 154, 1 O.S.H.C.
1497 (1974) (No. 703).
176. Carr, Erectors, Inc., 4 O.S.H.C. 1269 (June 4, 1976) (No. 7909).
177. Cleveland Wrecking Co., 12 O.S.A.H.R.C. 448, 2 O.S.H.C. 1090 (1974) (No. 1359);
Harvey Wrecking Co., 5 O.S.A.H.R.C. 147, 1 O.S.H.C. 1404 (1973) (No. 680).
178. Enterprise Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., 20 O.S.A.H.R.C. 335, 3 O.S.H.C. 1578 (1975)
(No. 12395). See also Boehm Pressed Steel Co., 14 O.S.A.H.R.C. 265, 2 O.S.H.C. 3258 (1974)
(No. 6579) (judge's decision) (employer cited for failing to post "no smoking" signs and install
fire extinguishers and machine guarding in a worksite that had been condemned by the state and
would soon be demolished).
179. 15 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(5), (6) (1970).
180. National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The court
stated the often repeated words concerning an employer's foreseeability concerning his em-
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or whether the violative acts of an employee were reasonably foreseeable by
the employer.'
The rare occurrence defense originated with a case before OSHRC involving an employer cited for the employees' failure to comply with a safety
standard requiring the wearing of hard hats in designated areas. "2 OSHRC in
that case recognized that an employer is not an "absolute guarantor" that an
employee will at all times comply with OSHA safety standards. The Commission outlined the boundaries of the rare occurrence defense by stating that
"[a]n isolated brief violation of a standardby an employee which is unknown
to the employer and is contrary to both the employer's instructions and a
company work rule which the employer has uniformly enforced does not
necessarily constitute a violation of section 5(a)(2) of the Act by the
83
employer."
The courts expect the employer to demonstrate that the incident causing
the violation was a rare occurrence, and OSHRC imposes no obligation on the
Secretary to show that the incident was not a rare occurrence. 184 The specific
elements of the rare occurrence defense, however, have not as yet been
enumerated by either OSHRC or the courts. One commissioner, in a concurring opinion, has suggested that a rare occurrence defense is appropriate
when an employer can show that an alleged violation is "a deviation...
from a company work rule or instructions. . . which are enforced," and that
"the deviation was unknown to the employer."' 8 5
The distinction between the Secretary's burden of demonstrating knowledge of a violation and an employer's burden of showing a rare occurrence is
often difficult to determine. As could be expected, the members of OSHRC
have divergent views.'86 The greater number of OSHRC decisions sustain a
citation when the Secretary has proved the existence of the violation, the
foreseeability of employee injury, and the employer's failure to implement a
work rule requiring employee compliance with the OSHA standard.
Lack of Control over Affected Employees. Multi-employer worksite situations have been a problem in both the substantive and procedural aspects of
OSHA. The courts are frequently confused about burdens of proof and the
elements of a violation in multi-employer situations; OSHRC often ignores
the statute and places substantially all burden of proof requirements upon
ployees: "Hazardous conduct is not preventable if it is so idiosyncratic and implausible in motive
or means that conscientious experts, familiar with the industry, would not take it into account in
prescribing a safety program. " Id. at 1266. The court also held that under the general duty clause
the burden of proof is on the Secretary to show that the employer's safety program was
inadequate. That burden extends to a showing that feasible measures would have materially
reduced the likelihood that unsafe misconduct by an employee would have occurred. Id. at
1265-67.
181. Cape & Vineyard Div. v. OSHRC, 512 F.2d 1148 (Ist Cir. 1975).
182. Standard Glass Co., I O.S.A.H.R.C. 594, I O.S.H.C. 1045 (1972) (No. 259). While the
case involved a citation for a general duty violation, the same defense is available to the employer
under § 5(a)(2) of the Act.
183. Id. at 596, 1 O.S.H.C. at 1046 (emphasis added).
184. Mississippi Valley Erection Co., 50.S.A.H.R.C. 483, I O.S.H.C. 1527(1973) (No. 524).
185. Murphy Pac. Marine Salvage Co., 15 O.S.A.H.R.C. 1, 2 O.S.H.C. 1464 (1975) (No.
2082).
186. Compare Weatherhead Co., 40.S.H.C. 1296 (June 10, 1976) (No. 8862), with Robert T.
Winzinger, Inc., 4 O.S.H.C. 1475 (July 22, 1976) (No. 6790). Note the dissenting opinions of
Commissioner Moran in both cases. 4 0.S.H.C. at 1298; 4 0.S.H.C. at 1477.
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each employer at a multi-employer worksite. 87 Consequently, the multiemployer worksite cases often raise the following issues: Who has control
over the exposed employees? What employer created the hazardous condition? Who had control over the hazardous condition? Who had the power to
correct the hazardous condition? Who exposed the employees to the hazardous condition? An employer would be wise, therefore, to present evidence
which establishes that he did not create or control the hazards, and that none
of his employees was exposed to the hazard.
C.

Procedural Defenses

The Secretary, when enacting standards for the enforcement of OSHA
provisions, is required to comply with certain procedural rules. The Secretary's non-compliance may excuse an alleged offender if prejudice can be
shown.188 Prior to the final promulgation of an emergency standard, for
example, the Secretary must show by a preponderance of the evidence that
such a standard is necessary to accomplish the purposes of OSHA.' 89
Affected employers are entitled to question and comment upon the efficacy
of the proposed emergency standard."9 For this reason, the Secretary normally releases the proposed standard to the public and schedules a hearing
prior to the standard's final adoption.
The Secretary's actions with respect to the enactment of a safety standard
are subject, prior to final promulgation, to attack in the courts by affected
employers. The court may vacate the standard and instruct the Secretary to
comply with correct promulgation procedures.1 91 Similar attacks may be
raised as a defense by employers receiving a citation for violation of standards improperly promulgated.' 92
The Secretary may also violate OSHA provisions by improper inspection
procedures. The inspection procedures require a presentation of credentials
prior to beginning an inspection and grant walk-around rights to an employer's representatives and employees. 93 The majority of OSHRC cases have
interpreted the inspection procedures to be "advisory" rather than "mandatory.' ' 194 Consequently, an employer's proof of an improper inspection will
not result in a successful defense to a violation of a safety standard absent a
showing of prejudice to the employer by the improper inspection.
187. See notes 106-19 supra and accompanying text.
188. National Roofing Contractors Ass'n v. Brennan, 495 F.2d 1294 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975) (a direct suit filed pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1970)).
189. Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 489 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1974) (an
attack on the promulgation of an emergency standard by an industry group filing a direct suit in
the U.S. district court).
190. Dry Color Mfrs. Ass'n v. Dep't of Labor, 486 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1973).
191. Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975); see Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Dunlop, No. 75-1959 (3d Cir., Feb. II,
1976). Both of these cases are direct suits pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1970).
192. One member of OSHRC considers such an attack to be a matter for decision only by the
courts. Noblecraft Indus., Inc., 3 O.S.H.C. 1727 (1975) (No. 3367), appeal docketed, No.
76-1106,9th Cir., Jan. 9, 1976. See alsoU.S. Steel Corp., 2 O.S.H.C. 1343(1974) (Nos. 2975 and
4349), appeal dismissed, No. 75-1031 (3d Cir. 1975); see note 29 supra and accompanying text.
193. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
194. Wright-Schuchart-Harbor Contractors, 2 O.S.A.H.R.C. 528, 1 O.S.H.C. 1138 (1973)
(No. 559); Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 14 O.S.A.H.R.C. 361, 1 O.S.H.C. 1086 (1973) (No. 224),
subsequent decision of OSHRC, 14 O.S.A.H.R.C. 361,2 O.S.H.C. 1413 (1974), appeal dismissed,
No.73-1181 (7th Cir. 1975).
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In one of the first challenges of an improper inspection to come before a
court an employer proved that a compliance officer, prior to conducting his
inspection, neither identified himself, presented credentials, nor afforded the
employer walk-around rights. 95 The court found that these facts, even if true,
did not constitute a valid defense to a citation because the compliance officer
had not inspected an area that was not open to the public and the employer had
failed to show prejudice by the officer's conduct."9 An improper inspection,
therefore, will not automatically constitute a valid defense to a citation unless
an employer demonstrates prejudice to the case brought about by the improper inspection.
The Secretary may also violate OSHA provisions by the improper issuance
of a citation and penalty. The statute provides that "[i]f upon inspection or
investigation, the Secretary . . . believes that an employer has violated [a
standard] he shall with reasonable promptness issue a citation to the employer.' 197 Soon after OSHA was enacted, OSHRC promulgated a rule providing that the Secretary must issue the citation within seventy-two hours after
the area director determines that a violation has occurred. 19 This rule has
been struck down, however, as being unsupported by the legislative history of
OSHA and illusory as to any procedural protection to employers.199 Even
before this decision, OSHRC had ruled that citations issued over seventy-two
hours after the inspection, but within the six months' statutory period, would
be vacated only if the employer showed that he was prejudiced by the
delay. 200 This prejudice test has apparently become the present OSHRC
rule. 2 1 The employer, therefore, has the burden of showing prejudice 20 2 by
the Secretary's delay as in other procedural defenses.
Finally, the Secretary may violate OSHA provisions by failing to forward
promptly the employer's notice of contest. The statute provides that in
employer who wishes to contest a citation or penalty must file with the
Secretary, within fifteen working days, a notice of contest. 20 3 The Secretary is
required to "immediately advise" OSHRC of the notice of contest at which
time OSHRC will docket the "appeal" so that administrative hearing procedures may begin. "Immediately advise" under OSHRC rules means within
195. Accu-Namics, Inc. v. OSHRC, 515 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1492,
47 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1976). See also Hartwell Excavating Co. v. Dunlop, No. 74-3275 (9th Cir., June
18, 1976). But cf. Western Waterproofing Co., 4 O.S.H.C. 1301 (June 21, 1976) (No. 1087).
196. Accu-Namics, Inc. v. OSHRC, 515 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1492,
47 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1976).
197. 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1970). The statute also prohibits issuance of a citation afier six

months following the "occurrence of any violation." Id. § 658(c). This prohibition, however,

pertains to discovery of a violation by the Secretary, and does not afford a defense to the
employer who has been in violation of the standard for more than six months prior to the
Secretary's inspection.
198. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 6 O.S.A.H.R.C. 244, I O.S.H.C. 1495 (1974) (No. 744),
vacated, 514 F.2d 1082 (7th Cir. 1975).
199. Brennan v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 514 F.2d 1082 (7th Cir. 1975).
200. See, e.g., Coughlan Constr. Co., 20 O.S.A.H.R.C. 641, 3 O.S.H.C. 1636 (1975) (Nos.

5303 and 5304).

201. Concrete Constr. Corp., 40.S.H.C. I 133 (Apr. 8, 1976)(No. 2490); Southern Ry. Co., 20
O.S.A.H.R.C. 691,3 O.S.H.C. 1657 (1975) (No. 5960), appeal docketed, No. 75-2493, 5th Cir.,
Dec. 19, 1975; Coughlan Constr. Co., 20 O.S.A.H.R.C. 641, 3 O.S.H.C. 1636 (1975) (Nos. 5303
and 5304).
202. Craig D. Lawrenz & Associates, Inc., 4 O.S.H.C. 1464 (July 21, 1976) (No. 5540);
Coughlan Constr. Co., 20 O.S.A.H.R.C. 641, 3 O.S.H.C. 1636 (1975) (Nos. 5303 and 5304).

203. 29 U.S.C. § 659(a) (1970).
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seven days of receipt of notice of contest. 2" A delay by the Secretary in
forwarding to OSHRC the notice of contest, however, will only be a successful defense to a citation if accompanied by a showing of prejudice to the
employer. °5
D.

ConstitutionalDefenses

From its inception, and long before its enactment, OSHA was met with a
battery of constitutional challenges. The courts refused, however, to rule
upon the constitutionality of OSHA until employers had exhausted their
administrative remedies, 2" and OSHRC held that it lacked jurisdiction to
determine the constitutionality of the law. Constitutional challenges to OSHA
have raised questions of a right of jury trial, the denial of procedural due
process, the denial of fifth amendment rights, 20 7 and the denial of fourth
amendment rights. 28 All constitutional objections to OSHA were denied by
the United States Supreme Court until March 22, 1976, when the Court
granted a writ of certiorari in two cases. 209 But review under the certiorari
grant is confined to an employer's seventh amendment right to a jury trial.
E.

Abatement of the Violation

Once the Secretary finds a violation, a citation and penalty are issued. The
Secretary then orders the employer to abate the violation by correcting the
hazardous condition within a specified time period. 210 Failure of the employer
to abate the violation subjects the employer to additional penalties of not less
than $100 per day for a non-serious violation and not less than $1,000 per day
for a serious violation. A notice of contest cuts off the abatement period until
a final order of OSHRC or the courts is entered, at which time the abatement
period resumes running. 21 1If OSHRC determines that the contest was not in
good faith but maintained solely for delay or avoidance, then a non-abatement
21 2
per day penalty may be assessed from the date of the citation.
Although OSHA does allow an employer, after he appeals to a circuit court
204. OSHRC Reg. 2200.32, 29 C.F.R. § 2200.32 (1975).
205. Brennan v. OSHRC, 487 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1973). The court suggested that the Secretary
could structure its citation form so as to enable the employer to "check boxes" on the form
returned to the Secretary and clearly designate whether he is appealing or not. Id. at 234 & n.7.
The suggestion has been ignored.
206. Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. Hodgson, 354 F. Supp. 20 (N.D.W. Va.), aff'd, 409 U.S. 1070
(1972); Lance Roofing Co. v. Hodgson, 343 F. Supp. 685 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd, 409 U.S. 1070 (1972)
(both cases alleging violations of fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh amendments). Both cases cited
W.E.B. DuBois Clubs v. Clark, 389 U.S. 309 (1967). In Stockwell Mfg. Co. v. Usery, No. 75-1437
(10th Cir., May 18, 1976), the court refused to consider constitutional questions not raised by the
employer before OSHRC.
207. In addition to cases cited in note 206 supra, see Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. OSHRC, 519 F.2d
1200 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 1458, 47 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1976) (No. 75-748); Atlas.
Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 518 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 1458,47 L. Ed. 2d
731 (1976) (No. 75-746).
208. Brennan v. Gibson's Prods., Inc., 407 F. Supp. 154 (E.D. Tex. 1976) (appeal to 5th Cir.
filed Feb. 25, 1976); Lance Roofing Co. v. Hodgson, 343 F. Supp. 685 (N.D. Ga.), aff'd, 409 U.S.
1070 (1972).

209. Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. OSHRC, 519 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct.

1458, 47 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1976) (No. 75-748); Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 518 F.2d 990 (5th Cir.

1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 1458, 47 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1976) (No. 75-746).
210. 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1970).
211. Id. §§ 659(b), 666(d).
212. Id. § 658(c).
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of appeals, to file an application for a stay of the OSHRC final order, such a
procedure is not favored by the courts. 213 Thus, the employer who contests a
citation and penalty may sometimes risk an additional fine for failure to
abate.2 4 In fact, the risk is two fold since OSHRC may increase the amount of
a contested penalty. 2 15 The Fifth Circuit recently rejected an employer's
claim that the risks of contest chilled his constitutional and statutory rights of
appeal.21 6 The court held that the employer's right to appeal to the circuit
court the increase of a penalty against him by OSHRC was a sufficient
"insulating factor. "217
V.

CONCLUSION

A fair reading of the cases both before OSHRC and the courts reveals that a
prima facie case of the Secretary is easily attained while defenses raised by an
employer are difficult to sustain. The procedural defenses are rarely successful, and the constitutional attacks have all been denied except for the fourth
amendment questions currently pending before the United States Courts of
Appeals, and the seventh amendment challenge pending before the United
States Supreme Court. If the Supreme Court upholds the seventh amendment
challenge, major changes of OSHA will be required, and it is doubtful that
Congress will attempt to reenact those forceful measures more often
criticized than applauded by the people.
Nevertheless, OSHA clearly needs major revisions. For example, OSHA
provisions may be revised to activate the passive and indifferent role Qf the
employee by a cooperative program designed to integrate the employee into
the compliance officer's search for hazardous working conditions. Currently,
employees, rather than welcoming an inspection by compliance officers,
resent the inspection as a threat to employment. Pre-inspection conferences
between compliance officers and employees could alleviate these fears.
The administrative procedures under OSHA are also faulty. Although
review by OSHRC should be review in a neutral forum, many OSHRC judges
are former hearing examiners who served as advocates of the Government
position. Consequently, the OSHRC judge is often as much of a prosecutor as
the Secretary. The administrative procedures under OSHA, however, should
213. Lance Roofing Co. v. Hodgson, 343 F. Supp. 685 (N.D. Ga.), aff 'd, 409 U.S. 1970 (1972).
The district court in that case was assured by the Secretary of Labor that OSHRC could stay its
own final orders under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59,701-06, 1305, 3105,
3344, 4301, 5335, 5362, 7521(1970). The court stated: "[W]e feared that such a risk would 'chill'
the right to judicial review secured by the Act." 343 F. Supp. at 689.
214. This assumes arguendo that the employer cannot abate or cannot afford to abate or will
not voluntarily abate the hazardous condition.
215. The Second, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits hold that OSHRC can increase penalties. See Dan
J. Sheehan Co. v. OSHRC, 520 F.2d 1036(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96S. Ct. 1458,47 L. Ed. 2d
731 (1976); REA Express, Inc. v. Brennan, 495 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1974); Brennan v. OSHRC, 487
F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1973). The Ninth Circuit stated that OSHRC cannot "enhance penalties." Dale
M. Madden Constr., Inc. v. Hodgson, 502 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1974). The Ninth Circuit court's
authority was an OSHRC case in which the Commission determined that it was without authority
to find an employer in willful violation if the Secretary had only cited the employer for a serious
violation, but the Commission could increase the Secretary's proposed penalty from $750 to
$1000. Witmore & Parman, Inc., 2 O.S.A.H.R.C. 288, 1 O.S.H.C. 1099 (1973) (No. 221).
216. Dan J. Sheehan Co. v. OSHRC, 520 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1458,
47 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1976).
217. Id. at 1041.
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insure that a presumption of innocence prevails in the OSHRC hearing; the
Secretary must carry his burden of proof without the aid of the OSHRC
judge. Similarly, an employer who has established a defense by a preponderance of the evidence should not be defeated by an OSHRC judge's interpretation of the Secretary's scintilla of evidence.
Out of the scramble for a workable system to increase job safety to fifty
million employees in the private sector has evolved the present confusion
regarding the rights and duties of both employers and employees. The
administration of OSHA has created an oppressed attitude among employers
and employees that the Government is not creating the safer workplace, but
rather havoc and hindrance in the business and industrial world. To reverse
this attitude and to make OSHA approach its lofty purposes will require a
gradual, judicially inspired improvement upon the present procedures of the
Secretary and OSHRC. Such an improvement must include an effort to
ddlineate precisely the rights, duties, and burdens of the Secretary, OSHRC,
and the employer.
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